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Introduction
We sometimes think of belief as an on-off attitude that we either bear to a proposition or do 
not.  Other times, it seems natural to think of belief as something graded.  I believe that I 
have two hands more strongly than I believe that the average US CEO earns over 200 times 
as much as the average US worker and, in turn, I believe that the average US CEO earns over 
200 times as much as the average US worker more strongly  than I believe that Mallory 
reached the summit of Chomulungma (Mount Everest) in 1924.  What considerations like 
this suggest is that propositions can at least be partially  ordered according to the strength of 
belief that I invest  in them.  Bayesian epistemologists tend to go further than this, claiming 
that the strength of belief that I invest in these, and other, propositions can be associated with 
real numerical degrees between 0 and 1, with 1 representing certainty of truth, 0 representing 
certainty of falsehood and 0.5 representing perfect agnosticism.  Degrees of belief, so 
understood, become the basic target of epistemic evaluation for Bayesians, who go on to 
provide a detailed story as to how they ought to be rationally policed.
 For the Bayesian, one’s overall doxastic state can be captured by a degree of belief 
function that takes propositions as arguments and yields real numbers as values.  There is 
something undeniably captivating about this picture, and yet it  sits rather uneasily alongside 
the old-fashioned, on-off notion of outright belief.  How exactly does outright belief fit into 
this picture?  A natural first thought to have is that outright belief should simply correspond 
to some suitably high degree of belief.  That  is, belief in a proposition will be ‘switched on’ 
when one’s degree of belief exceeds some threshold and ‘switched off’ when one’s degree of 
belief dips below that threshold.  This is sometimes termed the threshold view or Lockean 
thesis (see, for instance, Foley, 1992, 2009).  
Despite its initial attractiveness, though, the threshold view faces a range of 
difficulties, as a number of the papers in this volume discuss, including those by Ralph 
Wedgwood and Peter Milne.  In ‘Outright belief’ Wedgwood emphasises how the threshold 
view leads to the violation of consistency and closure norms that outright belief is intuitively 
subject to.  In ‘Belief, degrees of belief, and assertion’ Peter Milne demonstrates how difficult 
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it is to square the threshold view with a plausible account of assertion and the norms that 
govern it.
As Milne argues, there is little plausibility  to the idea that a high degree of belief in a 
proposition guarantees a willingness to assert it.  Furthermore, reflection upon the norms that 
govern assertion suggests that a rational high degree of belief in a proposition does not 
guarantee a warrant  or license for asserting it.  But these conclusions sit very uneasily 
alongside the idea that high degree of belief suffices for outright belief, and rational high 
degree of belief suffices for rational outright belief.   
In ‘The lottery  paradox and the pragmatics of belief’ Igor Douven also draws a kind 
of parallel between belief and assertion arguing, in particular, that the kinds of Gricean 
pragmatic considerations widely  agreed to influence the propriety of assertions may also 
affect the propriety  of beliefs.  This has the potential to be another complicating factor when 
it comes to any simple equation between outright belief and high degree of belief. 
While rejecting the threshold view, Wedgwood maintains the plausible idea that 
outright belief is ultimately reducible to degrees of belief, suggesting a more nuanced way as 
to how this reduction might proceed.  The crucial move is to separate out two different roles 
that degrees of belief have traditionally been thought to play – namely, tracking the perceived 
strength of justification that we have for various propositions, and guiding us in our practical 
deliberations.  Wedgwood draws a distinction between theoretical degrees of belief, which 
play  the former role, and practical degrees of belief that play the latter.  In Wedgwood’s view, 
it is practical degrees of belief that serve as a reduction base for outright belief. 
Elia Zardini, in his paper ‘Luminosity and Vagueness’, also draws a distinction 
between two different kinds of degrees of belief – albeit one that is motivated in a very 
different way.  Building upon remarks made by Williamson (2000, section 4.4), Zardini 
distinguishes between what he calls credences and doxai or degrees of outright belief.  While 
the former are closer to degrees of belief as orthodox Bayesians conceive them, it is the latter 
that connect with outright beliefs (perhaps in a threshold-like way).  According to Zardini, 
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careful attention to the properties of these two sorts of doxastic attitude can serve to 
undermine Williamson’s influential ‘anti-luminosity’ argument.     
  
 As mentioned above, the Bayesian assumption that degrees of belief correspond to 
real numbers paves the way for the central tenets of orthodox Bayesianism: A static constraint 
to the effect  that one’s degrees of belief ought to conform to the probability axioms – one’s 
degree of belief function ought to be a probability function – and a dynamic constraint to the 
effect that degrees of belief ought to be updated by conditionalising on new evidence.  The 
papers by Alan Hajek, Carl Hoefer and Kenny Easwaran and Branden Fitelson all concern, 
though in rather different ways, static rationality constraints upon degrees of belief.
There is some disagreement amongst  orthodox Bayesians as to whether the former, 
probabilistic constraint is the only  static constraint to which one’s degrees of belief must 
conform, if one is to be rational.  Some have been attracted to the idea that one’s initial, pre-
conditionalisation, degree of belief function ought to be regular – assigning a 0 degree of 
belief only to propositions that are inconsistent or impossible (see Lewis, 1980, 1987).  In ‘Is 
strict coherence coherent?’ Alan Hajek presents a battery of arguments to the effect that, 
despite appearances, regularity should not be regarded as a norm of rationality  – there are 
epistemically possible propositions in which we should, and perhaps must, invest a 0 degree 
of belief.  Interestingly, a different argument to similar effect  can be found in Wedgwood’s 
paper.   
In 'An "evidentialist" worry about Joyce's argument for probabilism' Kenny Easwaran 
and Branden Fitelson are concerned with the Bayesian probabilistic constraint itself – and, in 
particular, with a certain style of argument that has been offered in favour of this constraint. 
The most familiar way of motivating the probabilist constraint is via Dutch Book arguments 
that purport to show that violation of the constraint  carries with it a susceptibility to sure 
monetary loss (see, for instance, de Finetti, 1980).  Easwaran and Fitelson, however, are 
concerned with a more recent argument in favour of the constraint, showing that any  non-
probabilistic degree of belief function is accuracy dominated by a probabilistic one (Joyce, 
1998).  That is, for any  nonprobabilistic degree of belief function, there is a probabilistic 
function that outperforms it, in terms of accuracy, at all possible worlds (and for a suitable 
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accuracy  measure).  As Easwaran and Fitelson demonstrate, the argument breaks down once 
further rationality constraints upon degrees of belief are brought into play.
 
 In addition to rationality  constraints upon degrees of belief, some have been attracted 
to the idea that degrees of belief are subject to a norm of calibration (van Fraassen, 1983, 
Lange, 1999).  Suppose one assigns a certain degree of belief to each of a range of 
propositions.  Put very roughly, this degree of belief assignment might be described as ‘well-
calibrated’ just  in case, amongst this range of propositions, the proportion of truths is equal to 
the degree of belief assigned.  It’s natural to think that degrees of belief need something to 
aim at or aspire after, in the same way that outright beliefs seem to aim at being true.  It’s 
sometimes argued that  calibration is cut out to play  this role – that degrees of belief aim at 
being well calibrated.  In ‘Calibration: Being in tune with frequencies’ Carl Hoefer defends a 
version of this idea and answers a number of objections that have been levelled at the 
calibrationist approach.   
This special issue originates from a pair of workshops dedicated to topics in the area 
of overlap between formal and traditional epistemology.  The first of these was held at the 
XXX and the second at the XXX.  All the papers collected here were presented at one of the 
two workshops.  We would like to take this opportunity to thank the Analysis Trust, the 
British Society for the Philosophy of Science, the Mind Association, the XXX for financially 
supporting these two events.
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